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Abstract: 
This paper explores differing theories on how the failure of the ‘peace process’ 
featured in the design and goals of the UfM, drawing on lessons from the period 
when the EMP was pursued in parallel with the peace process. In each case, 
institutional overlaps are indentified, as well as commonalities in the approaches 
of the actors to both pursuits. Crucially, however, the persistence and 
intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in combination with the shift from 
multilateralism to bilateralism embodied in the UfM, has politicized the latter at 
the expense of the functionalist aspirations of its architects.  
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
The objective here is to define the relationship between the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) and the unsuccessful Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). 
The operating assumption is that the Arab-Israeli conflict represents a key 
feature of the context within which the UfM was launched and one of the main 
questions explored is whether the UfM was created as a way to downscale 
European ambitions in the face of a deteriorating situation in the Middle East. 
Then, in keeping with the line adopted in the framework paper for this volume, 
the argument developed is that the UfM could not avoid entanglement with the 
conflict. 
 
Contrasting views on the impetus behind the UfM are examined in the first 
section below and as will be seen, the verdict on how it relates to the MEPP 
depends in part on how one understands the relationship between the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the MEPP. As discussed in the second 
section, the vision embodied in the EMP could not be realized without a 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the architects of the EMP tended to 
assume that the MEPP would take care of that.  
 
On this they were disappointed, but the failure was due more to flaws in the 
design of the peace process in the 1990s, than to the weaknesses of the EMP. 
Also, while the failure of the MEPP was a blow to the EMP, this was only one of 
the factors that led to disillusion and frustration with the EMP and thence the 
creation of the UfM. 
 
As argued in the third section, however, in so far as the UfM did represent an 
attempt to refocus European ambitions in the face of reversals in the peace 
process, its fate will rest on whether it can be ring-fenced or insulated from the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The likelihood of achieving such a separation is deemed 
remote, principally because of changes in the regional and international context 
stemming from ‘the war on terror’ declared after 11 September 2001 (9/11) and 
the fallout from the invasion of Iraq. As a result of these developments the 
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salience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has increased, rendering it less 
plausible that the UfM can attain its modest objectives in isolation. 
 
There are other reasons why the fate of the UfM is inseparable from that of the 
dysfunctional MEPP. The UfM has been built on the edifice of the EMP and this 
was informed by assumptions about the normative mission of the European 
Union (EU). Thus too much hope has been invested in the capacity of so-called 
‘soft power’1 to effect change in the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs), 
notwithstanding persistent failures by the Europeans to act on or abide by their 
professed norms. As argued in the fourth section here, European declaratory 
policy represents a retreat from reality into the safety of simple pronouncements 
and self-serving projects.  
 
In the fifth section below attention turns to some of the individual European and 
Arab actors and their stance on the MEPP. As demonstrated, even if the 
Europeans put risk avoidance above conflict resolution, for the Arab states the 
need to keep conflict-resolution on the international agenda, including through 
the UfM, is a matter of survival.  
 
Another reason for skepticism that the UfM can succeed in attaining its limited 
goals has to do with the institutional framework within which the EMP and now 
the UfM, as well as the MEPP operate. The MEPP is an international endeavour, 
led by the United States, and the UfM is a regional initiative, presided over by a 
joint presidency (starting with France and Egypt). Yet the two are institutionally 
linked through a plethora of mechanisms, including the Middle East Quartet (that 
groups the EU, UN, US and Russia), the Arab Peace Initiative (devised and 
agreed by the Arab League, which now participates in the UfM) and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The implications for the UfM of these 
overlapping institutional arrangements are explored in the sixth and final section 
of this paper. 
 
I. The UfM and the Conflict: adapting to realities? 
 
As Kausch and Youngs (2009), Bechev and Nicolaidis (2008) have suggested, 
the UfM was conceived partly as a way to forge closer economic ties and security 
cooperation between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean 
notwithstanding the conflict. Although these commentators are sceptical about 
the prospects, they detect a perception, among some of the original architects of 
the scheme, that the conflict could be sidelined or ‘parked’ as a separate 
concern, to be dealt with primarily within the framework of the MEPP. On the 
latter, in contrast to the UfM, the United States has been expected to take the 
lead.  
 
As explored in other papers in this volume, the motives of the individual 
European players who signed up to the UfM were varied. For France the initiative 
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represented an opportunity for President Nicolas Sarkozy to take a lead on 
matters Mediterranean.2 The French also identified a need to make up for the 
flagging fortunes of the EMP. Spain scrambled to respond to the challenge the 
French lead posed to its role in the Mediterranean.3 Germany was initially critical 
of the initiative because Sarkozy appeared set on pursuing his scheme at the 
expense of the EMP.4 Turkey, in turn, reacted negatively at first for fear that the 
proposal would affect its bid to join the EU (Balfour and Schmid, 2008; Emerson, 
2008). 
 
In all these cases the capacity of the UfM to affect or be affected by the quest for 
Arab-Israeli peace seems not to have featured centrally in the actors’ 
calculations. By contrast, Israel’s initial response to the UfM was influenced by 
concerns that the Arab League would be accorded a bigger role in the plan than 
it had been given in the EMP.5 In other words, the Israelis feared spill over from 
the conflict into the proceedings of the UfM. For some Arab states, meanwhile, 
there could be no question of foregoing any new opportunity to air their 
frustrations with Israel’s continued occupation of Arab lands captured in 1967. 
Arab resistance to ‘normalising’ their relations with Israel, following the Israeli 
assault on Gaza in 2008-09 and the advent of a more hardline Israeli government 
since then, have already undermined the progress of the UfM (Barber, 2010; 
Vogel, 2010). 
 
Turning to the official pronouncements of the UfM, in these the desirability of 
conflict resolution is acknowledged but not emphasised. At the launch in Paris in 
2008 the Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their ‘support for the Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Process’; recalled that peace in the Middle East ‘requires a 
comprehensive solution’; and welcomed ‘the announcement that Syria and Israel 
have initiated indirect peace talks under the auspices of Turkey’ (Joint 
Declaration of the Paris Summit, 2008: Article 7). Yet, as the EMP before it, the 
UfM espouses the objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of 
peace, stability and prosperity through dialogue and cooperation (Barcelona 
Declaration, 1995; Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit, 2008). Arab-Israeli 
peace is thus ipso facto incorporated into the vision of the UfM. 
 
The linkage between the UfM and the MEPP is also evident in the orientations, 
calculations and policies of European and Arab actors and Israel in their dealings 
with each other.6 In institutional terms there are also overlaps and 
interconnections, as discussed below. The thrust of this inquiry, therefore, is to 
determine how closely the fate of the UfM is tied to that of the dysfunctional 
MEPP.  
 
This question is clearly not quite the same as asking what effect the continuance 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict will have on the prospects for the UfM. If the conflict 
continues, by definition the goal of developing an area of peace in the 
Mediterranean will not be met. Yet that does not eliminate the possibility that the 
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UfM could pave the way for conflict resolution by generating more cooperation in 
other spheres, such as economic development, job creation, intelligence sharing 
and cross-cultural understanding (Aliboni and Ammor, 2009).  
 
What matters, therefore, is the underlying logic with which the various 
stakeholders approach both the UfM and the MEPP. Belief in the power of 
economic development and institutional reform to counter instability and conflict 
informed the EU approach to both the EMP and the MEPP, but in neither case 
did the Europeans live up to the principles they espoused (Tocci, 2005; Pace, 
2009; Al-Fattal, 2010). On the Arab side, at least at the government level, a 
determination to retain power has infused their approaches to both the EMP and 
the MEPP (Fernández and Youngs eds., 2005; Pace, 2010). For Israel, the UfM 
represented a potential opportunity to subsume the conflict.7 
 
The UfM largely dispenses with the normative agenda that characterised EU 
aspirations for the EMP in its early years (Aliboni and Ammor, 2009; Kausch and 
Youngs, 2009). However, that agenda was abandoned or reneged upon long 
before the launch of the UfM, notwithstanding persistent references to European 
‘values’ in EU rhetoric.8 The way political reform featured in the EU approach to 
the MEPP also represented a betrayal of the ideals purportedly espoused by the 
EU. This became apparent after the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 and 
more markedly following the election victory of Hamas in 2006, as discussed 
below.  
 
Thus, even though the UfM has been greeted by some as a sign that realism has 
replaced wishful thinking, there is still room to question that conclusion. If the EU 
had truly woken up to reality, then its approaches to both the UfM and the MEPP 
should embody greater recognition of the growing dangers posed by the conflict.  
Latterly, not only has the problem of extremist movements and transnational 
terrorism become a shared concern for European and Arab governments, but it 
has become conflated with the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, that conflict has 
worsened, compounded by the failures of the MEPP. The UfM does not offer a 
resolution and the elevation of north-south dialogue to state level increases the 
likelihood that the initiative will become hostage to the conflict.  
 
II. The EMP and the MEPP: Pointers for the UfM 
 
The existence of a seemingly promising MEPP at the time the EMP was 
launched in 1995 enabled the latter to go ahead on the assumption that its vision 
for an area of peace, stability and prosperity could be realised (Dosenrode and 
Stubkjaer, 2002). It also made it possible to argue that the EMP would serve to 
‘underpin’ the MEPP and anticipated peace deals (Marks, 1996: 2). However, the 
EMP was not specifically envisaged as an alternative or rival to the MEPP.  
 
Hollis, R. (2011) ‘The UfM and the Middle East “peace process”: an unhappy symbiosis’, 
Mediterranean Politics, 16 (1), 99–116. 
Author’s pre-publication copy – to cite refer to published text. 
 
 5
On the contrary, in the mid-1990s the preoccupation in Europe was not with the 
Arab-Israeli conflict but with the security problems posed by Islamist extremism 
emanating from North Africa and manifest in the bomb attacks in France in 1995.  
The security agenda that the EMP was supposed to address had to do, first and 
foremost, with migration, arms proliferation, Islamist terrorism, instability and 
economic malaise in the south (Bicchi, 2007; Hollis, 2000:125). As argued in a 
report issued by the EU Institute for Security Studies, one of the faults of the 
EMP was that it failed to face up to realities, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(Aliboni et al, 2008). 
 
Over time a number of scholars and commentators have examined the 
achievements and failings of the EMP and by all accounts it has fallen short of 
meeting its declared goals. These included: a political and security partnership, 
establishing ‘a common area of peace and stability’; economic and financial 
partnership, ‘creating an area of shared prosperity’; and partnership in social, 
cultural and human affairs (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). It is on the second of 
these objectives that most attention has focused and the verdict commonly 
reached is that prosperity has eluded the majority of people in the MPCs and the 
gap between standards of living in the north and south has widened (Joffé 
ed.,1999; Radwan and Reiffers, 2005). Economic growth and development in 
Israel, by contrast, has overtaken that of some EU countries (Nathanson & 
Stetter eds., 2005).  
 
Assessments of the progress of the EMP in achieving its other objectives have 
been largely scathing. Pace (2007), among others, deconstructs the normative 
approach of the EU and documents the pernicious consequences for democracy 
promotion in the MPCs. Al-Fattal (2010), focusing on EU aid and policies to build 
a functioning democracy in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), charges 
the EU with reneging on its own principles and promises, to the detriment of the 
Palestinian people and their prospects of statehood. Pace, Al-Fattal and Le More 
(2005) highlight the failure of the EU to tackle the core problem facing the 
Palestinians, namely: the Israeli occupation. 
 
With respect to the security agenda, in an early assessment Spencer (1997) 
contends that the EU proved unable to develop a partnership with the MPCs 
distinctive from or coordinated with other initiatives such as those of NATO and 
the WEU. She also points to the contradictions inherent in the EU approach to 
Mediterranean security, in so far as it hoped to protect Europe from migration 
and instability in the south, while speaking the language of partnership. Aliboni 
and Ammor (2009) among others highlight the betrayal of the EMP vision implicit 
in the increasing emphasis placed on intelligence sharing and security 
cooperation between governments, at the expense of political reform. 
 
A common feature of many assessments of the EMP, shared by this author, is 
that it failed to meet expectations largely because the Europeans hoped to use it 
Hollis, R. (2011) ‘The UfM and the Middle East “peace process”: an unhappy symbiosis’, 
Mediterranean Politics, 16 (1), 99–116. 
Author’s pre-publication copy – to cite refer to published text. 
 
 6
as a vehicle for the export of values and practices that could not and would not 
meet with acceptance in the MPCs. Conceivably, therefore, the Europeans were 
either unrealistic or naïve, or a combination of both. A close reading of EU 
pronouncements and stated expectations gives credence to the latter.9 The 
alternative explanation, namely that the Europeans were disingenuous, would 
mean that while they claimed to want to promote democracy, free trade and 
cooperation, they actually intended to use such claims as a cloak for furthering 
their own interests, including stemming the flow of migration from south to north. 
To hold up, this explanation would imply an absence of the kind of assumptions 
about the benefits of adopting EU values that informed the whole EU enterprise 
(Le More, 2005; Hollis, 2009). 
 
Irrespective of whether the Europeans were naive or disingenuous, it may be that 
the EU, weakened by the competing interests of member states, was 
outmanoeuvred by Arab governments and Arab elites intent upon protecting their 
interests (Hamzawy, 2005; Hollis, 2009; Khouri, 2010). Equally important, as 
argued here, is that intervening events, in particular 9/11 and the issue of 
terrorism linked to Islamist groups, transformed priorities in Europe and in the 
MPCs, overriding the reform agenda (Fernández and Youngs, 2005).  
 
Turning to the MEPP, it could conceivably be argued that its failure was either a 
symptom or a consequence of the flaws in the EMP .However, neither the EMP 
nor the MEPP can be reduced to a dependent variable of the other. The two 
endeavours coexisted and the verdict here is that the MEPP pursued in the 
1990s, under US leadership, was itself flawed (Keating et al, eds., 2005; Miller, 
2008) and only one of its shortcomings could be laid at the door of the EU for 
focusing on state-building in the OPT to the neglect of policies designed to bring 
an end to the occupation. After the outbreak of the second Intifada the EU made 
more mistakes, as discussed below. The key point here, however, is that, in the 
1990s at least, the failings of the EMP cannot be attributed solely or even mostly 
to the dysfunctional MEPP per se. 
 
The context changed after 2000 and the collapse of the MEPP, partly as a result 
of the second Intifada and changes in government in the United States and 
Israel, but also because of 9/11 and all that flowed from that. How these 
developments affected European and Arab attitudes towards the MEPP and the 
EMP is the subject of the next section. 
 
III. The UfM in Context: No Escape from the Conflict 
 
At various stages in the past forty years the Europeans, the Maghreb and the 
Arab Gulf states have proceeded on the assumption that progress could and 
should be made toward closer economic ties and security cooperation 
irrespective of the continuance of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the 1970s and 
1980s, for example, the Europeans developed their relations with the Arab world 
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and Israel on a bilateral basis (Ismael, 1986) in a manner deliberately intended to 
ensure that the continuance of the conflict would not be allowed to interfere with 
their pursuit of closer commercial links and energy security.  
 
In the 1990s by contrast, complementarity and convergence were assumed and 
welcomed between the EMP and the MEPP. When the latter collapsed there was 
a reversion to bilateralism, including at the level of EU-Arab and EU-Israeli 
relations, through the ENP.10 However, de-linkage between the conflict and 
schemes for Mediterranean integration was no longer an option. The US 
declaration of ‘the war on terror’ following 9/11 and the disruption of the regional 
balance of power resulting from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 saw to that.  
 
The ‘war on terror’ meant that all US allies were expected to demonstrate their 
loyalty: ‘You are either with us or you are with the terrorists’! The reaction in 
Europe was initially strongly supportive of the United States in its hour of need. 
French President Jacque Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair went to 
Washington to signal solidarity. Blair declared that Britain stood ‘shoulder to 
shoulder’ with America.11 NATO invoked the Treaty to support military action 
against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. However, in a portent of what was to come, 
Washington declined to make use of NATO in the initial stages of the subsequent 
invasion. Having learned from experience in the Balkans, the Americans were in 
no mood for the frustrations of coalition warfare. 
 
Serious divisions emerged in the transatlantic alliance over how to combat al-
Qaeda-inspired terrorism (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004). By its very nature, the EU 
is committed to internationalism and international law. The Bush administration, 
by contrast, positively relished the prospect of acting alone, informing the 
Europeans that their job was to do ‘the nation-building’ in the wake of US war-
fighting (Kagan, 2002; Gordon and Shapiro, 2004). 
 
In the background, under the leadership of Ariel Sharon, the Israelis depicted 
themselves as steadfast allies fighting ‘in the same trench’ as the Americans 
against the menace of Islamist inspired terrorism. Palestinian President Yasser 
Arafat was denigrated as a sponsor of terrorism and blockaded in his compound 
in Ramallah. European governments refused to go along with the delegitimization 
of Arafat and their officials continued to pay him visits, but they failed to convince 
the Americans or the Israelis to take him seriously any more as a ‘partner for 
peace’. EU policy became focused on the limited objective of keeping the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) afloat in the face of a crushing Israeli assault on its 
operations and infrastructure (Hollis, 2004). 
 
After the fall of the Taliban regime in Kabul in late 2001 it soon became apparent 
that the United States planned to take the war against terror into the Middle East. 
In his State of the Union address in January 2002 Bush designated Iran and Iraq 
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along with North Korea as part of ‘an axis of evil’. For the remainder of the year 
the prospect of a US invasion of Iraq gathered pace and the EU divided.  
A semblance of unity was restored when the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1441, initiating a new round of weapons inspections in Iraq. However, 
when the inspectors failed to find conclusive evidence of an active Iraqi weapons 
programme, the Security Council split. France called for more time for the 
inspectors. The British joined the Americans in frantic lobbying at the UN, but 
failed to gain a green light for an invasion. Blair nonetheless convinced the British 
parliament to agree to military action, and in March 2003 British troops 
accompanied the Americans into Iraq. Because the Turkish parliament refused to 
facilitate entry from the north, Kuwait provided the sole point of access for the 
ground assault.  
 
Once Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled and the UN formally recognized the 
occupation of Iraq, Washington called on its allies to help quell the resistance. 
The East Europeans offered the most enthusiastic support. Spanish troops were 
also deployed, but withdrawn again, in the wake of the Madrid bombings. As 
these demonstrated, far from reducing the threat of Islamist inspired terrorism, 
the invasion of Iraq exacerbated it. Meanwhile, both Arab and European allies of 
America tried to persuade Washington that the plight of the Palestinians was part 
of the problem. The United States was not convinced. 
 
Offering a ray of hope, in 2002 Bush did issue the first formal US endorsement of 
a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Seizing on this opportunity 
the EU set about drafting the roadmap that they hoped would turn Bush’s ‘vision’ 
into reality. Yet Sharon outmanoeuvred them, conditioning Israeli cooperation on 
the marginalization of Arafat and securing US recognition that Israel could not be 
expected to return to the 1967 borders in the event of a peace deal. 
 
The lesson here is that the Europeans, with or without Arab concurrence, were 
powerless to push the MEPP in the absence of US and Israeli commitment to a 
solution. Added to which, because of differences among the Europeans over the 
Iraq crisis, the ambition of the EU to achieve a unified and effective foreign policy 
stance suffered a severe setback. On the need for resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict they could still agree, but divisions over Iraq reduced European leverage 
and credibility in Washington. As US forces faced a full scale insurgency and 
sectarian conflict in Iraq, European opponents of the invasion forbore to say ‘I 
told you so’! Instead, all made efforts to repair their relations with Washington 
and in the process re-invigorated their commitments to combating terrorism 
through intelligence cooperation and new strictures on their own migrant 
populations and asylum seekers.  
 
Among these measures, in 2003 the EU decided to add Hamas to its list of 
terrorist organisations (Hroub, 2006:113-16). This move may have helped 
marginally to appease Washington and the Israelis, but also paved the way for 
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EU paralysis after Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in January 
2006. EU commitment to pursuing the MEPP through the Middle East Quartet 
also served to dilute the role of the EU and signalled a new preoccupation with 
policy coordination across the international community as opposed to effective 
action, as discussed below. 
 
The fallout from the invasion of Iraq meanwhile transformed the context of the 
MEPP. Two consequences deserve mention. First, having found none of the 
weapons programmes cited to justify the invasion, the Bush administration 
espoused a new rationale, namely regime change and democratisation across 
the region. As the United States launched its reform initiative for the Broader 
Middle East and North Africa in June 2004 the EU responded with its own 
strategy, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), also launched in 
2004. Having invested so much through the EMP in promoting economic and 
political reform in the MPCs, the EU hoped to demonstrate more substantive 
results through differentiation and Action Plans tailored to the specific needs and 
capacities of the partner countries. In the process, an opportunity to build in 
conditionality related to conflict resolution was overlooked. 
 
Secondly, the invasion of Iraq produced a surge in anti-Americanism (Revisiting 
the Arab Street, 2005), not only in the region but among Muslim populations 
everywhere, including Europe. Resentment of US high-handedness proved more 
widespread, in conjunction with a rise in Islamophobia. The principal beneficiary 
in the region was Iran and its allies Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in the OPT. 
Hizballah soon became embroiled in war with Israel in July 2006. The 
psychological victory was claimed by Hizballah, since its forces managed to keep 
up a hail of rockets into Israel until the day a ceasefire was finally agreed. 
 
During the 2006 Lebanon war the Europeans and Arabs were again divided 
(Hollis, 2010). The French were among those calling for an immediate ceasefire. 
Britain held off doing so immediately in the hopes that Hizballah could be quelled 
first. Saudi Arabia and Egypt also hoped that Hizballah would be chastened, but 
ended up having to join the general Arab outcry against the Israeli bombardment 
of Lebanon. 
 
Within two years Israel went to war again, this time against Hamas in Gaza. The 
Palestinians lost over a thousand lives, many of them women and children, while 
Israeli dead numbered only thirteen. In Europe, the fate of the Palestinians in the 
Gaza war of 2008-09 gained them increased popular support. Yet when Israel 
comes in for criticism for its treatment of the Palestinians, there is always the 
danger that this could conflate with anti-Semitism. Certainly the Israelis are 
attentive to this possibility and have used the spectre as leverage on European 
governments.  
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As the foregoing demonstrates, thanks to the fallout from the invasion of Iraq, the 
Middle East has become more unstable. The old order, dominated by the Arab 
states, has been weakened and the new beneficiaries are the non-state actors 
Hizballah and Hamas, together with Iran. 
 
In this situation all the stakeholders in the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot consider it 
a localized problem, capable of marginalization. Since 2009 the Syrians have 
gained new prominence as the potential weak link in the Iran-Syria-Hizballah 
axis. President Assad was feted by President Sarkozy as the star at the launch of 
the UfM, simply by turning up, and France has since proceeded with upgrading 
relations with Damascus without the latter having to change any aspect of its 
regional posture or domestic politics (ICG, 2009). Damascus has also been the 
object of US diplomatic approaches since Obama came to power. Yet without 
Israeli cooperation the Americans cannot wean the Syrians away from their 
alliance with Iran or their support for Hizballah and Hamas. 
 
France may have wanted the dual presidency of the UfM, and selected Egypt to 
serve alongside France in the first instance, for reasons unrelated to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Egypt, by contrast, could not miss an opportunity to raise the 
issue. As the leading state representative of the Arabs in the UfM, in which the 
Arab League is also represented and could upstage Cairo, Egypt’s regional 
standing and prestige are at stake. Turkey’s new profile in the region, its defence 
of the Palestinians at the time of the Gaza war and its reaction to Israel’s 
commando raid on the flotilla that sought to break the Gaza blockade in 2010 
represent a challenge to Egypt. In short, if ever the possibility of sidelining the 
Arab-Israeli conflict existed, it is no longer feasible. 
 
IV. Europe’s Misleading Normative Narrative 
 
Attention now turns to the evolution of European thinking on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. European perspectives have progressed through several phases since 
the British and French finally exited their last imperial domains. In the 1970s the 
first oil price shock and fear of Arab reprisals for support for Israel persuaded 
most Europeans to embrace a more pro-Arab stance on the conflict (Ismail, 
1986). By the time the Europeans chose the Arab-Israeli conflict as the test case 
for the development of a common European foreign policy, culminating in the 
Venice Declaration (1980), the United States had taken the lead in conflict 
mediation. 
 
Israel rejected the Venice Declaration and Washington proceeded with its own 
diplomacy. After Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, France attempted its own 
mediation policy, alongside the United States, including deploying troops. Yet 
both their efforts foundered. After the leadership of the PLO was evacuated to 
Tunis, the Europeans proved unable to adopt a unified approach to dealing with 
the organisation. However, the scene changed in 1990-91 as the Cold War 
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ended and the United States marshalled an international and Arab coalition to 
reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. When the United States and post-Soviet 
Russia convened the Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid, the Europeans 
were accorded observer status only. 
 
Since then and substantively in the 1990s the EU has played junior partner to the 
United States in the pursuit of conflict resolution (Dosenrode and Stubkjaer, 
2002). After Norway brokered the so-called Oslo Accords, Washington took 
charge of driving what became the MEPP. The EU participated in the multilateral 
process that accompanied bi-lateral negotiations until the mid-1990s (Peters, 
1996) and presided over the Regional Economic and Development Working 
Group (REDWG). The EU became the single largest donor to the Palestinian 
Authority (PA), elected and constituted under the MEPP (Al-Fattal, 2010: 51-3). 
 
In the 1990s EU policy on the Mediterranean and the MEPP could be 
characterised as a ‘soft-power’ approach to addressing European security needs 
(from migration to terrorism) through the disbursement of economic development 
aid, institution building and the promotion of good governance. Thus, when the 
PA was established in the OPT the Europeans, individually and collectively 
through the EU, concentrated on giving development aid and helping the PA 
govern the Palestinians. This suited the Americans, who reserved management 
of the political negotiations between the Palestinian leadership and Israel to 
themselves. In both respects there was palpable progress initially, but after the 
election of a Likud government led by Netanyahu, he proved resistant to 
implementing the provisions of Oslo.  
 
Meanwhile, the expansion of Jewish settlements in the OPT continued. Periodic 
terrorist attacks on Israelis by Palestinians, some under the Hamas banner, also 
undermined confidence. However, given the devotion of the Clinton 
administration to pursuing peace and renewed hope following Labour’s return to 
power in Israel in 1999, the Europeans apparently saw little purpose in breaking 
ranks with the Americans. However, retrospective analysis on the MEPP during 
the 1990s, has deemed it flawed (Keating et al, 2005), Not only did it require the 
Palestinians to build a state-in-waiting while still under occupation and with no 
guarantee from Israel or even Washington at that stage that statehood would be 
the reward but US diplomacy proved partial to the Israelis (Miller, 2008).  
 
In effect, the Europeans became complicit in a US-led strategy that required the 
Palestinians to control their own militants and forego resistance in the name of 
convincing the Israelis to end the occupation. Yet, in so far as the PA did so, the 
Israelis could sustain the occupation. In terms of the dichotomy between 
functionalism and politicisation depicted by Bicchi in the framework paper for this 
volume, with respect to the MEPP the EU has opted for a functionalist approach 
to Palestinian state-building which has turned out to have highly political 
consequences. 
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Rather than draw attention to the occupation and focus on bringing it to an end, 
the EU may have actually helped to perpetuate it, on which, see more below. In 
any case, when the second Palestinian Intifada erupted in 2000, the peace 
process collapsed and the Israelis responded by reasserting control by force. 
The PA only survived thereafter thanks to EU support.  
 
The EU was by this time a member of the Quartet and through this mechanism 
worked to develop the roadmap that was supposed to turn into reality what Bush 
announced as his ‘vision’ for a two-state solution in 2002. Thereafter, policy 
coordination, within Europe and across the Quartet, substituted for action. 
Inability to force through implementation of the roadmap symbolized the 
ineffectiveness of the MEPP in the first years of this century. This failure turned 
to counterproductive meddling after the Hamas victory in the Palestinian 
legislative elections of January 2006. 
 
During and following those elections the United States briefed members of the 
Palestinian Fatah movement to resist any form of compromise or cooperation 
with their Hamas rivals for power in the PA. The Quartet formulated three 
principles that Hamas was expected to embrace to gain acceptance: renunciation 
of violence; recognition of Israel’s right to exist; and acceptance of all 
agreements previously signed between the Palestinian leadership and Israel. 
This was a recipe for stalemate. When Saudi Arabia brokered a power-sharing 
agreement between Fatah and Hamas in 2007, Washington scuppered the deal. 
 
Realism or Retreat? 
From the Venice Declaration of 1980 to the Conclusions of the Council of 
Ministers in December 2009, the EU has led the way on declaratory policy. In 
their conclusions, the ministers called for ‘a two-state solution’ to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, with ‘the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, 
contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and 
security’ (Council Conclusions, 2009). 
 
The Council also stated that the EU ‘will not recognise any changes to the pre-
1967 borders including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the 
parties’ and that, in the interests of ‘genuine peace, a way must be found through 
negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two 
states’. Beyond this, the Council noted that: ‘A comprehensive peace must 
include a settlement between Israel and Syria and Lebanon.’ 
 
A declaration of what should happen is not, however, a plan of action. 
Successive EU statements have not spelled out what the Europeans would do to 
make the parties to the conflict conform to their wishes. Also, while pronouncing 
on what is required for an end to the conflict, EU dealings with the protagonists 
have not made progress on bilateral relations conditional upon the 
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implementation of steps to reach a two-state solution. Israel has not been 
punished for continuing the occupation, house demolitions, the confiscation of 
Palestinian homes and land, or construction of the security barrier that was 
deemed in contravention of international law by the International Court of Justice 
in 2004. 
 
The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have languished under a blockade that the EU 
has branded unacceptable and counterproductive. What finally prompted Israel 
to ease the blockade – but not end it – in June 2010, was not EU action but the 
fallout from the deadly Israeli commando raid on the flotilla of ships mounted by 
civilian volunteers that challenged the blockade. Turkey, not the EU, applied 
most pressure and Washington called for a re-think (BBC, 2010; Khalaf, 2010). 
 
Meanwhile, the EU has been active in supporting Palestinian institution-building 
under the emergency administration of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in the West 
Bank. Europeans are working with the Americans and Canadians to train 
Palestinian police and security forces to keep law and order in Palestinian towns 
(Asseburg, 2009b). The logic of these endeavours rests on the assumption that 
the PA must be prepared to take on the responsibilities and tasks of government 
when statehood is realised. The EU pays the salaries of PA police, civil servants, 
teachers and medical workers, including those of Fatah members in the Gaza 
Strip who are instructed to stay at home rather than work for Hamas-run 
organisations. According to European Commission figures, between 2000-09 the 
EU disbursed over €3.3bn in aid to the Palestinians.12 Pace (2010), Al-Fattal 
(2010) and Brown (2010) argue that this approach has been counterproductive 
and a disservice to the Palestinians. 
 
The net result of EU endeavours is conflict management, not resolution. In 
contrast to the situation that attained in the 1990s, when European aid was 
channelled into development projects in the West Bank and Gaza, today the EU 
only finances the running costs of a PA which is not subject to legislative 
oversight and whose remit only runs in so-called Areas A and B, while the 
remainder of the West Bank (sixty per cent) is still under Israel control and in 
which settlements have not been removed or curtailed.  
 
The unelected PA owes its survival to the EU, but it only serves to keep the 
peace, improve internal governance and regulate business within Palestinian 
towns and villages which remain separated by Israeli check points, interspersed 
with Israeli settlements and by-pass roads, sealed off from Israel by the security 
barrier and separated from Gaza.  
 
Thus, the EU is not totally inactive. On the contrary, its members are busy and 
engaged, but only on the Palestinian side and this in ways that have undermined 
Palestinian unity and prospects. European support for the PA in the West Bank 
and complaints about the blockade of Gaza add up to no more than a holding 
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strategy as opposed to a transformative one. EU tax payers’ money is being 
used to relieve the Israelis of the costs of occupation and EU policy is not 
directed at rolling back that occupation. 
 
V. The Role of Individual Actors 
 
Here attention turns to the positions of three European states (Britain, France 
and Germany) and two Arab states (Egypt and Jordan) on the MEPP. Whereas 
in the past each believed in their individual capacity to make a contribution to that 
process and invested resources accordingly, latterly they have retreated to risk 
avoidance in the case of the Europeans and survival mode in the case of Egypt 
and Jordan.  
 
Britain, France and Germany 
The positions of all the European actors on the Middle East ‘peace process’ can 
be identified across a spectrum of positions on: (a) their relative sympathy or 
antipathy to the positions of the core protagonists in the conflict; (b) the 
importance they attach to their bilateral relations with Washington; and (c) the 
costs and benefits of raising their profile in the MEPP.  
 
Taking as a benchmark the categorisations of different actors in the UfM 
introduced by Bicchi and discussed in other papers here, over the past twenty 
years Britain, France and Germany have sampled the roles of ‘entrepreneur’, 
‘leader’, ‘veto-player’, and ‘low profile supporter’. The descriptions ‘favour 
exchangers’ and ‘unhappy laggards’ do not fit. In all their roles, however, the 
three states have assumed that they are not acting in a vacuum and that the 
involvement of other Europeans and the United States is a pre-requisite for a 
successful peace process. 
 
Whereas between 1948 and 1967 France was the leading supplier of arms to 
Israel, as of the 1967 war it decided against this role and turned its attention to 
developing better relations with the Arab world. Thereafter, until Sarkozy arrived 
on the scene, France could be identified as more sympathetic to Arab rather than 
Israeli concerns. Demonstrating independence from Washington also featured in 
French motivations (Hoffman, 1971), along with seizing opportunities to provide 
leadership in Europe. 
 
In the 1980s France adopted the role of ‘entrepreneur’ in several contexts, 
notably in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion of 1982. France was also an 
open supporter of the Iraqi regime in the Iran-Iraq war, when Britain and the 
United States preferred to give limited support to Baghdad in secret and through 
Arab surrogates. 
 
In the 1990s France championed the cause of expanding EU relations with the 
Maghreb, and through the EMP sought to match German initiatives for Eastern 
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Europe. Itself the target of terrorist action linked to Algeria, Paris led on 
development of security cooperation between Arab governments within the 
context of the EMP. France was also far less enthusiastic about the political 
reform agenda than the northern Europeans (Youngs, 2006). With respect to the 
MEPP, France was in the forefront of European calls for attention to international 
law in the formulation of peace proposals, at the same time as developing 
projects in the OPT designed to garner publicity for France. 
 
In contrast to France, since the Suez debacle the British have accorded high 
importance to maintaining close relations with Washington. Until the 1980s the 
British were also more sympathetic to the Arabs than Israel, but during the 1980s 
Margaret Thatcher took a tough line on terrorism, including refusing to meet 
members of the PLO. The arrival of Tony Blair at 10 Downing Street marked a 
new period of British activism. Blair played the role of would-be entrepreneur on 
several occasions, but always in a manner intended to help the US leadership in 
the MEPP (Hollis, 2010: 70-85,135-57). 
 
The Germans, by contrast to both the British and the French have adopted the 
role of ‘low profile supporter’ of the MEPP and occasionally ‘veto player’ within 
the EU. Developing a close and supportive relationship with Israel was vital to 
ridding the Germans of the stigma of the Nazi era and making recompense to the 
Jews, through compensation payments to Israel (Lavy,1996). Consequently, 
Germany could be counted on to veto any European initiative which could be 
depicted as biased against Israel. However, with the advent of the Oslo process, 
the Germans did begin to build a profile in the OPT with a diplomatic presence 
and assistance, including through the party Schtiftungen, to Palestinian projects 
and NGOs.13  
 
Latterly, changes of government in Germany, France and Britain have led to 
shifts in their positions.14 Angela Merkel has gone out of her way to demonstrate 
German support for Israel, including speaking before the Israeli Knesset. 
Reportedly, one if her motives is to demonstrate that she, an East German, is 
prepared to own and atone for the Nazi past (Dempsey, 2010). Sarkozy has 
deliberately sought closer relations with Washington and shown greater warmth 
towards Israel than was typical of France in the past. Since the departure of Tony 
Blair from government in Britain, the British have declined to take a strong lead or 
even act as entrepreneurs in the context of the MEPP. Overall, given their 
preoccupations with adjusting to the new economic constraints affecting all three 
countries, it seems unlikely that the governments of Britain, France or Germany 
will be in the mood to launch any new initiatives on the Middle East for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
Egypt and Jordan 
Across the Arab world public support for the Palestinian cause and antipathy 
toward Israel is intense and volatile, As a result autocratic Arab regimes tend to 
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use every opportunity to align themselves with such sentiments at the same time 
as trying to avoid having to take any actions that might turn animosity into war. 
Israel is not an opponent that any Arab state can contemplate engaging in battle 
without heavy penalty – as experienced by Lebanon in 2006 when Hizballah 
initiated a conflict that led to major destruction and over a thousand Lebanese 
deaths, many of them civilians. 
 
It is not surprising therefore that Egypt and Jordan, the only two Arab countries 
that have peace treaties with Israel, are constantly urging both the Americans 
and the Europeans to do more to end the Israeli occupation. In both cases the 
governments are frequently pressed by their publics to sever relations with Israel 
in protest at Israeli actions, but neither have done so, for fear of the 
consequences. 
 
Herein lies one of the problems that befell both the US and the EU reform 
programmes. Real democracy in Egypt or Jordan could lead to the election of 
groups and parties who would scrap what they regard as their current 
governments’ appeasement of Israel. It was for fear of this spectre and the rise of 
Islamist movements generally that the EU and the United States have ceased to 
press the reform agenda.  
 
In addition, both Egypt and Jordan are in an especially difficult position because 
of their proximity to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively. If Egypt 
opens its borders to Gaza and Jordan eases access for West Bank Palestinians, 
in both cases they would relieve Israel of some of the pressure to end the 
occupation. 
 
As a consequence, both Egypt and Jordan lack the leverage to pressure Israel 
and must rely on others to do so. It is thus to be expected that both states will 
regard the UfM as an opportunity to make themselves heard. As mentioned 
above, as co-president of the UfM, Egypt in particular must regard it a positive 
responsibility to keep the conflict on the agenda.15 
 
V. Institutional Overlaps and Conclusions 
 
As discussed in other papers here, it is possible to assess the institutional 
architecture of the UfM in terms of two dichotomies: regionalism versus 
bilateralism; and functionalism versus politicization. As the foregoing discussion 
indicates, in all respects the UfM is entangled with the institutional arrangements 
that frame the MEPP.  
 
Unlike the UfM, the MEPP is an international endeavour and as of 2002 and the 
formation of the Middle East Quartet, the United States, the UN, the EU and 
Russia have combined forces in pursuit of a common stance on Middle East 
peace. In 2002 the Arab League launched the Arab Peace Initiative (API), re-
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launched in 2007, as a collective Arab contribution to resolving the conflict. 
Within this context the EU and the Arab League, as well as some of the 
signatories to the API, are parties to the ENP and have signed up to the UfM. 
 
To make clear distinctions between these structures, their functions and their 
goals is therefore unrealistic. To cite one example of functional overlap, EU 
engagement in the MEPP has been pursued through some of the same 
instruments and structures developed under the EMP and the ENP (Al-Fattal, 
2010) which, in the latter case at least, continue to function. Thus the ENP Action 
Plan for the PA is actually more about fulfilling the expectations for Palestinian 
state-building envisaged as part of the MEPP than preparing the Palestinian 
economy for harmonisation with the EU. In addition, successive EU collective 
and unilateral practical initiatives to aid Palestinian ‘state-building’ have 
embedded the European bureaucratic and security endeavours and personnel in 
the infrastructure of the occupation. 
 
The linkages have become compounded over time. The Madrid process sought a 
comprehensive approach, but devolved onto bi-lateral tracks. Oslo was the 
central feature of this narrow approach, but when it failed, the effort to revive it 
became multilateral, through the Quartet. The API is a quest to shift from a 
bilateral approach to making peace deals (as was the case with Egypt and 
Jordan) to a regional or ‘comprehensive’ approach. Both the EU and the United 
States have sought, belatedly, to capitalize on this, but only in so far as the Arabs 
might be persuaded to ‘deliver’ the Palestinians to the table. The Arabs have 
refused to take any steps towards ‘normalization’ with Israel unless and until it 
withdraws from the Occupied Territories. This resistance to normalization is now 
being played out in the UfM. 
 
Within this context, neither the UfM nor the unproductive MEPP is reducible to 
the status of a dependent variable in the relationship between the two. However, 
both are the product of the mindsets or worldviews of the actors involved, as 
repeatedly indicated above. In the case of the Europeans, they have operated on 
the assumption that the values embraced by all EU members and embodied in 
the acquis are not only positive for them but also for any other country (Hollis, 
2009). Among the MPCs meanwhile, a worldview prevails that is positively 
suspicious of EU intentions and values. These mindsets also informed the EMP 
and the MEPP in the 1990s, but have evolved in response to failures on both 
counts, as well as exogenous factors, including 9/11, the Iraq crisis, fallout from 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the resulting intensification of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
 
The EU’s declaratory policy on the MEPP, together with its narrow focus on 
Palestinian ‘state-building’ in the West Bank and the adoption of the limited 
objectives of the UfM indicate a retreat in the face of a gathering storm. For the 
Arabs, particularly Egypt and Jordan, that storm could spell destabilization. 
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Hence the scene seems set for turbulence from which the UfM cannot be 
immune. 
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